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Abstract. Unlinkability is a privacy property of crucial importance for several
systems (such as RFID or voting systems). Informally, unlinkability states that,
given two events/items in a system, an attacker is not able to infer whether they
are related to each other. However, in the literature we find several definitions
for this notion, which are apparently unrelated and shows a potentially problem-
atic lack of agreement. This paper sheds new light on unlinkability by comparing
different ways of defining it and showing that in many practical situations the
various definitions coincide. It does so by (a) expressing in a unifying framework
four definitions of unlinkability from the literature (b) demonstrating how these
definitions are different yet related to each other and to their dual notion of “in-
separability” and (c) by identifying conditions under which all these definitions
become equivalent. We argue that the conditions are reasonable to expect in iden-
tification systems, and we prove that they hold for a generic class of protocols.
1 Introduction
Unlinkability is a privacy propertywhich holds when an attacker cannot identify the link
between two or more items in a system. This property is fundamental in the context of
identification systems. For instance, a person who buys an item with an EPC tag at a
shop may expect that the protocol used to identify tags prevents his/her tracking.
In this paper we use Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems as a case study
for our protocol analysis. RFID systems are a wireless technology for automatic iden-
tification consisting of a set of tags, readers and a backend. Tags usually offer very
limited resources, while backends and readers have standard computational resources.
An identification protocol allows tags to authenticate to a backend exchanging informa-
tion through a reader. One of the main issues raised by the widespread use of RFID is
that of privacy. The problem is that anyone in the neighbourhood of a tag may access it
wirelessly, and the resource limitation of RFID tags makes it difficult to use full-fledged
cryptographic algorithms. The ease of access paves the way to misuse: an attacker could
exploit tags to follow the movements of people or goods. The attacker does not even
need to break anonymity, since a tag sending the expiry date of a product already allows
a certain degree of tracking.
These privacy concerns lead to the definition of unlinkability (sometimes called
untraceability or privacy). In the case of RFID systems, unlinkability [17, 21, 4, 5, 22, 8,
26] is satisfied if an attacker is not able to infer whether two sessions have been executed
by the same agent. In the RFID literature, unlinkability is usually defined either in a
computational setting in terms of games [10, 17, 21, 4, 22] or in a symbolic setting [12,
13, 2, 3, 7]. [12] proposes a definition of untraceability in a trace-based model. [2, 3]
formalize protocols in the applied pi calculus and define weak and strong unlinkability
in terms of trace and observational equivalence respectively. Finally, [7] proposes a
definition of unlinkability in the applied pi calculus, inspired by the unlinkability games
of the computational setting.
As most definitions are different in model and strength, there is no agreement in
the literature on the concept of unlinkability. The goal of this paper is to create a better
understanding of this notion by comparing the strength of different definitions and de-
termining whether the differences have a practical impact on real world systems. Our
contribution is threefold. First, we express four trace-based definitions of unlinkability
from the literature in a unifying model. We start with the one of weak unlinkability
from [12, 3]. By strengthening it, we obtain the definition of strong unlinkability from
[3]. Then, we express two game-based notions [10, 17, 4, 20, 7], and we give a definition
that capture them both.We also investigate inseparability, a notion dual to unlinkability,
which requires that the attacker cannot infer that two messages are not linked. Second,
we identify a set of conditions and demonstrate that, when they hold, all the above
forms of unlinkability and inseparability coincide. Last, we prove that these conditions
are satisfied by a generic class of simple identification protocols from [7].
These results help us to understand the essence of these privacy properties.Working
in an abstract setting, we can concentrate on their inherent nature – the inability to dis-
tinguish certain traces – without dealing with the complications of a concrete model. As
a result, the definitions and the conditions under which they coincide become intuitive,
while the results can be transferred to a concrete trace model as we do in Section 6.
Plan of the paper. Section 2 briefly introduces epistemic logic. Section 3 presents our
abstract trace model. Section 4 states several definitions of privacy using epistemic
logic. Section 5 presents several conditions and shows that all the privacy properties
coincide under them. Section 6 presents the class of RFID single-step protocols and
shows that they satisfy all the conditions stated in Section 5. Section 7 lists the related
work. Section 8 and provides conclusions.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we briefly introduce epistemic logic with public announcements, a logic
modeling agent knowledge, that we later use to formalize privacy properties. Only the
basic concepts are stated here, we refer the reader to [18] for more details.
Let P be a set of propositional constants (atoms). The set L(P ) of epistemic for-
mulas ϕ, ψ, . . . over A is given by:
ϕ, ψ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∨ ψ | Kϕ | [ϕ]ψ
with p ∈ P . The formulaKϕ means “the attacker knows ϕ”, while [ϕ]ψ means “after
ϕ is revealed, ψ holds”. The semantics is given in terms of Kripke structures. A Kripke
structure M is a tuple (S, f,∼) where S is a set of possible states, f : S → 2P is
a function assigning to each state a set of atoms that hold in that state, and ∼ is an
equivalence relation on S. Intuitively, s1 ∼ s2 means that from the attacker’s point of
view, the two states are indistinguishable. The semantics of the logic is given by:
M, s  p iff p ∈ f(s);
M, s  ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, s  ϕ andM, s  ψ;
M, s  ϕ ∨ ψ iffM, s  ϕ orM, s  ψ;
M, s  ¬ϕ iff s 2 ϕ;
M, s  Kϕ iff s′  ϕ for all s′ such that s′ ∼ s.
M, s  [ϕ]ψ iff (M, s  ϕ impliesM |ϕ, s  ψ)
Intuitively,M, s  ϕ means that M satisfies ϕ at state s (we write s  ϕ when M is
clear from the context). The interesting case is the knowledge operatorK: the attacker
knowsϕ at state s iff ϕ is satisfied in all states that are indistinguishable from s from the
attacker’s point of view. For the [ϕ] operator, letM |ϕ be a Kripke structure obtained by
M by restricting only to states satisfyingϕ, i.e. having state space S′ = {s ∈ S |M, s 
ϕ}. Intuitively, revealing ϕ (in a state where ϕ holds) restricts the model to a smaller
one where ϕ always holds. Then [ϕ]ψ is true if ψ holds in the restricted model.
3 A trace-based model
In a system, agents exchange messages according to a protocol with a specific purpose.
To capture one or more protocol runs in our model, we introduce the concept of trans-
actions. A transaction starts when the attacker gains access to an agent and lasts until
the attacker loses it. During the transaction the attacker can passively eavesdrop or ac-
tively forge messages. We allow the attacker to execute an arbitrary number of protocol
sessions within a transaction, while knowing that the agent participating in the transac-
tion does not change. However, when a new transaction starts, the agent involved can
be either the same as before, or a different one, and the attacker’s goal is to distinguish
these two cases. The attacker’s intentions are captured by the concept of a strategy. For
example, the attacker might passively eavesdrop a session, then build a new message
and send it to the agent executing another transaction, and so on. An attacker strategy
and a mapping of transactions to agent identities, completely defines a trace.
Definition 1. A system is a tuple (A,Σ,T,∼) where:
– A = {a1, a2, . . .} is a (possibly infinite) set of agents; we assume an ordered set
of transactions {p1, p2, . . .}, and we denote byΠn = {p1, . . . , pn} → A the set of
assignments of n transactions to agents;
– Σ is a set of strategies; each strategy σ ∈ Σ has a length |σ|; we denote the set of
transactions involved in the strategy byDomσ = {p1, . . . , p|σ|};
– T = {(π, σ) | σ ∈ Σ, π ∈ Π|σ|} is a set of traces; each trace τ ∈ T is a tuple
(π, σ) where σ is a strategy and π is a mapping of transactions to agents;
– ∼ is an equivalence relation on T such that (π1, σ1) ∼ (π2, σ2) ⇒ σ1 = σ2.
A trace τ ∈ T is a complete execution of the system, and is determined by a strategy
σ, chosen by the attacker, and a mapping π, which the attacker does not control, that
defines which agent participates in each transaction. A protocol is an abstract object
Table 1. Unlinkability and Inseparability
Property Epistemic formula The attacker cannot infer
WU ¬Klink(p, p′) that two messages p, p′ are linked
SU ¬K(anyLink) the existence of linked messages
GB-1 [πa ∨ πa′ ]¬Kπa the mapping πa even when πa ∨ πa′ is revealed
GB-2 [πa,a ∨ πa1,a2 ]¬Kπa,a the mapping πa,a even when πa,a ∨ πa1,a2 is revealed
WI ¬K(unlink(p, p′)) that two messages p, p′ are unlinked
SI ¬KanyUnlink the existence of unlinked messages
that describes the behaviour of the agents in a system. Each protocol generates the set
T of all the possible traces that can be obtained under any attacker strategy σ ∈ Σ. The
relation ∼ is crucial for defining privacy properties. Consider two traces τ1 = (π1, σ)
and τ2 = (π2, σ), produced when the attacker chooses the strategy σ and interacts with
two different sets of agents. If τ1 ∼ τ2, it means that when using the strategy σ, the
attacker cannot distinguish between the sets of the agents.
We sometimes use πτ to emphasize that it belongs to the trace τ . For a trace τ =
(π, σ), we write Domτ for Domσ , |τ | for |σ| and Aτ , Aπ for the image of π (i.e. the
set of agents involved in the trace). For a mapping π ∈ Πn we define |π| = n and we
denoteΠ = ∪n≥1Πn. Since transactions are ordered, we write mappings as sequences
of agents, e.g. π = (a4, a1, a2) assigns agent a4 to the first transaction, a1 to the second
and a2 to the third ones. We extend ∼ to mappings as follows:
π ∼ π′ iff |π| = |π′| and (π, σ) ∼ (π′, σ) ∀σ ∈ Σ s.t. |σ| = |π|
Note that we keep our model abstract and do not explicitly define the messages in the
protocol, the exact strategies Σ and the relation ∼. We assume that these are produced
by a concrete protocol model (such as the one given in Section 6).
4 Unlinkability definitions
In this section we express several definitions of unlinkability from the literature in our
trace-based model: the weak unlinkability of [12, 3], the strong unlinkability of [3], and
two game-based definitions [10, 17, 4, 20, 7]. Finally, we introduce the notion of insep-
arability, which does not appear in the literature, but arises as a natural dual notion to
unlinkability. Our purpose is not a technical comparison between definitions expressed
in different models, but a comparison between the ideas behind each definition.
Table 4 gathers all the resulting notions.
4.1 Kripke structure
To express unlinkability using epistemic logic, first we have to define a Kripke structure
M = (T, f,∼) corresponding to a system (A,Σ,T,∼). T is the set of states and the
attacker’s indistinguishability relation ∼ is provided directly by the system. The set of
atomic propositions P and the assignment function f : T→ P are built as follows:
P = Π ∪ {link(p, p′) | p, p′ ∈ Domτ , p 6= p
′, τ ∈ T}
f((π, σ)) = {π} ∪ {link(p, p′) | π(p) = π(p′)}
We use two types of propositions: π ∈ Π denotes that the mapping of the trace is
π, while link(p, p′) denotes that the transactions p, p′ are linked, i.e. they are mapped
to the same agent in a given trace. Note that link(p, p′) holds iff p 6= p′, which we
implicitly assume in all the definitions.
4.2 Weak Unlinkability
The first definition is the one of weak unlinkability of [12, 3]. Although presented in
different models, they are similar in nature, both requiring that, given a trace where two
messages are linked, an equivalent trace must exist where those messages are unlinked.
Definition 2 (Weak unlinkability). A protocol generating the set of traces T guaran-
tees weak unlinkability iff
∀τ ∈ T, p, p′ ∈ Domτ : τ  ¬K(link(p, p
′))
This definition imposes that the attacker does not know whether any two given transac-
tions are linked to each other. This implies that for all traces τ and all pairs of distinct
transactions, there must exist an equivalent trace τ ′ ∼ τ in which the transactions are
mapped to two different agents. So the above definition can be written as:
∀τ ∈ T, p, p′ ∈ Domτ : ∃τ
′ ∈ T, τ ′ ∼ τ : τ ′  ¬link(p, p′)
which corresponds exactly to the one of [12, 3]. The weakness of this definition lies in
the fact that it does not completely prevent the attacker from obtaining knowledge about
linked transactions. For example, in a system satisfying weak unlinkability, the attacker
could still know that p1 is linked to either p2 or p3, but without knowing which one.
4.3 Strong Unlinkability
[3] also defines a strong version of unlinkability by requiring that a system is equivalent
to one where each agent executes one session only. Their definition, in a simplified form
and without entering into details, requires that !T ≈ !Ts where T = νm. init. !main
and Ts = νm. init. main. T represents an agent executing an initialization phase
(init) and an unbounded number (denoted by !) of protocol sessions (main), while Ts
is an agent executing one session.≈ denotes observational equivalence in [3], while we
use trace equivalence here because it is directly expressable in our model. To capture
this definition in our framework, we not only require that the attacker is not able to infer
the link between two given transactions, but also the existence of linked transactions.
Definition 3 (Strong unlinkability).We say that a protocol generating the set of traces
T guarantees strong unlinkability iff
∀τ ∈ T : τ  ¬K(anyLink)∀p, p′ ∈ Domτ
where anyLink =
∨
p
∨
p′ link(p, p
′).
anyLink holds for a trace if there exists at least a linked transaction. Thus, strong
unlinkability holds iff the attacker does not know whether there exists a link at all. For
this to hold, each trace must be equivalent to one with no linked transactions:
∀τ ∈ T : ∃τ ′ ∈ T, τ ′ ∼ τ : ∀p, p′ ∈ Domτ : τ
′
 ¬link(p, p′)
This formulation corresponds exactly to the definition of Arapinis et al. since τ ′ is a
trace that can be produced by the process !Ts, where no agent executes more than one
transaction.
4.4 Game-based definitions of privacy
In the game-based definitions, privacy is defined as the result of a game between an
attacker (whose goal is to distinguish between the actions of different agents) and a
challenger. We refer to two different types of game-based definition of privacy: the first
is related to the definition of [21], variations of which can be found also in [10, 17, 4,
22], while the second corresponds to the definition given by [10, 20]. We demonstrate
that in our model, these two classes of definitions are equivalent to each other and to a
third simpler definition of game-base unlinkability based on trace equivalence.
Both types of games consist of three phases. In the first game, which we call two-agents
game unlinkability, during the first phase the attacker can interact with all the agents of
the system. In the second phase, the attacker is asked to select two agents a, a′. The
challenger selects an agent x ∈ {a, a′}, and gives x to the attacker, hiding its identity.
The attacker can interact with all the agents, including a and a′, and, in the final phase,
she wins the game if she can infer whether x is a or a′ with non-negligible probability.
We use πx to denote a partial mapping from transactions to agents, where some trans-
actions are mapped to a variable x, while all the others are known to the attacker;Πx is
the set of all the partial mappings. πa is a mapping obtained from πx by mapping to an
agent a all transactions previously mapped to the variable x. We formalize this game by
requiring that the attacker cannot infer whether she is given a mapping πa or πa′ . Thus,
a protocol generating the set of traces T guarantees two-agents game unlinkability iff
∀τ ∈ T, a, a′ ∈ A, πx ∈ Πx : τ  [πa ∨ πa′ ]¬Kπa (1)
Although the only forbidden knowledge concerns πa, (1) is equivalent to τ  [πa ∨
πa′ ]¬Kπa′ , thus the attacker cannot know πa′ either. This property implies the equiva-
lence of the mappings πa and πa′ under all strategies, thus we can express (1) as:
∀a, a′ ∈ A, πx ∈ Πx : πa ∼ πa′
The second game, which we call three-agents game unlinkability, can be found in a
computational [10, 20] and a formal setting [7]. Only the second phase differs from the
previous game: the attacker selects three agents a, a1, a2 and the challenger gives her
two agents x, y, that are set to either x = y = a or x = a1, y = a2; the attacker wins if
she can infer whether x and y are linked. We now use πx,y as a partial mapping, Πx,y
as a set of all the partial mappings and πa,b as a complete mapping obtained from πx,y.
We require that the attacker cannot infer whether she is given a mapping πa,a or πa1,a2 .
A protocol generating the set of traces T guarantees three-agents game unlinkability iff
∀τ ∈ T, a, a1, a2 ∈ A, πx,y ∈ Πx,y : τ  [πa,a ∨ πa1,a2 ]¬Kπa,a (2)
In terms of equivalence of traces, (2) can be restated as follows:
∀τ ∈ T, a, a1, a2 ∈ A, πx,y ∈ Πx,y : πa,a ∼ πa1,a2
It is easy to see that both the games require all mappings to be equivalent. Thus, we
give a definition of game-based unlinkability which unifies these two notions.
Definition 4 (Game-based unlinkability). We say that a protocol generating the set
of traces T guarantees game-based unlinkability iff
∀π, π′ ∈ Π, |π| = |π′| : π ∼ π′ (3)
Each of the referenced works uses a variant of either (1) or (2), while [10] mentions
both, referring to the first as untraceability and to the second as unlinkability, but does
not explore the relation between them. Instead, we can prove that they reduce to Def. 4:
Theorem 1. A protocol satisfies game-based unlinkability iff it satisfies two-agents
game unlinkability, which it does iff it satisfies three-agents game unlinkability.
From now on we will only use the definition of game-based unlinkability. However, by
Theorem 1, all the results that hold for game-based unlinkability hold also for the other
game-based notions. Finally, as one may expect, we can show that strong unlinkability
and game-based unlinkability are both stronger than weak unlinkability.
Theorem 2. Strong unlinkability and game-based unlinkability imply both weak un-
linkability.
Note that strong unlinkability has already been proven to imply weak unlinkability by
[3] in their model in the applied pi calculus.
4.5 Inseparability
In some situations we want to hide the existence of unlinked transactions. In fact, an
attacker might be interested in changes in the system rather than in tracking agents.
For example, consider a high security location protected by a guard who authenticates
himself using an RFID tag. The attacker might want to be alerted when a new guard
appears. The definitions of weak and strong unlinkability impose no conditionwhen two
messages are unlinked, thus we introduce the concept of inseparability, which requires
that the attacker does not know that two transactions are not linked.
Definition 5 (Inseparability). We say that a protocol generating the set of traces T
guarantees weak inseparability iff ∀τ ∈ T, p, p′ ∈ Domτ : τ  ¬K(unlink(p, p
′))
and strong inseparability iff ∀τ ∈ T : τ  ¬K(anyUnlink) where unlink(p, p′) =
¬link(p, p′) and anyUnlink =
∨
p
∨
p′ 6=p unlink(p, p
′).
As expected, strong inseparability is stronger than weak inseparability. On the other
hand, somewhat surprisingly, game-based unlinkability is stronger than strong insep-
arability, although game-based unlinkability is incomparable to strong unlinkability,
which is incomparable to strong inseparability. The reason is that game-based unlinka-
bility enforces all traces to be equivalent to one performed by a single agent.
Theorem 3. Game-based unlinkability implies strong inseparability, which in turn im-
plies weak inseparability.
The above properties are in general different (the implications not covered here do not
hold in general), as shown by the following examples; in the next section we investigate
conditions under which some or all of the properties become equivalent.
4.6 RFID systems: protocols where the properties do not coincide
In this section we list some examples of RFID protocols that guarantee only some of
the properties described in Section 4. They are variations of the OSK protocol (see Sec-
tion 6, although understanding the protocol is not needed to follow the examples) that
satisfies all the properties. Here we introduce features that cause some properties to fail.
These features are artificial and unlikely to be present in realistic protocols. In fact, in
the next section, we identify some conditions under which all properties coincide.
Example 1 (System with a bounded number of tags). Consider a system with a bounded
number of tags. If the attacker observes a number of sessions greater than the number
of tags, she knows that there exist some linked sessions, although she cannot point to
any specific message, i.e. weak unlinkability holds, but strong unlinkability does not.
Still, all the traces of equal length produced by the OSK protocol are equivalent, thus
game-based unlinkability holds. As a consequence, also strong inseparability holds. 
Example 2 (System with several “types” of tags). Consider a system with two distin-
guishable types of tags Type1 and Type2, for example because they differ in technical
characteristics. Weak inseparability and game-based unlinkability are violated since the
attacker can distinguish tags of different type. Instead, strong unlinkability holds: the
adversary cannot know the existence of linked transactions since all transactions of the
same type could come from different tags. Together with the previous example, this
shows that strong unlinkability and the game-based definition are incomparable. How-
ever, if the number of tags of Type2 is bounded, we have a situation similar to the
previous example (although the total number of tags might still be unbounded); again,
strong unlinkability is violated while weak unlinkability holds. 
Example 3 (Protocol outputs depending on past sessions I). Consider a variation of the
OSK protocol where the reader beeps when the session it is executing is linked to a
previous session, but only if at least two tags appeared before it. This protocol satisfies
weak unlinkability: the beep does not allow the attacker to point to any two specific
linked sessions. Despite this, the attacker knows that the session that made the reader
beep must be linked to a past session. Consider the observation where the reader beeps
at the third session. The beep tells him that the third session is either linked to the first or
the second one, and the first two sessions are not linked, violating strong unlinkability
and weak inseparability. Since not all mappings are equivalent to each other due to the
beep, game-based unlinkability is also violated. 
Example 4 (Protocol outputs depending on past sessions II). Consider a variation of
the OSK protocol where the reader beeps when the third tag of a trace first appears.
The protocol satisfies weak unlinkability, but violates strong unlinkability: if the reader
beeps after four or more sessions, there must be a link. Game-based unlinkability is
violated, since not all the traces are equivalent. It also breaks weak inseparability, since
a beep during the third session means that the first three sessions are unlinked. 
Example 5 (Protocol outputs depending on past sessions III). Consider a variation of the
OSK protocol where the reader beeps when it sees at least two tags and one link. The
protocol satisfies weak unlinkability but violates strong unlinkability and game-based
unlinkability. Strong inseparability is also violated, because a beep means that at least
two tags run some session. However, the attacker cannot link two specific sessions, thus
weak inseparability holds. 
5 Conditions under which the properties coincide
In this section we identify a (large) class of protocols C and we demonstrate for these
protocols that all the notions of unlinkability and inseparability are equivalent: if a pro-
tocol in C satisfies any of them, then it satisfies all of them. The class C is given by all
the protocols satisfying the five conditions that we identify in the next section, where
we argue that most RFID protocols actually satisfy them, at least in their abstract form.
5.1 Conditions
Condition Unbounded number of agents. As we showed in Example 1, a system
with a bounded number of agents cannot satisfy strong unlinkability, since observing
a greater number of transactions reveals that at least two transactions are linked. Thus,
protocols in C contain an unbounded number of agents.
Definition 6. A protocol has an unbounded number of agents iff ∀n > 0∃τ ∈ T :
|Aτ | = n.
Clearly, an unbounded number of agents is not realistic. However, identification systems
have usually a wide number of agents, thus an attacker cannot usually communicate
with all of them in a limited amount of time, and does not know the total number of
agents. This is why, at an abstract level, this condition is often assumed in the literature.
Condition Renaming. As shown in Example 2, having distinguishable types of agents
can be problematic. However, in real systems agents are usually identical in function-
ality, differing only in the secret information. As a result, we can expect that replacing
all transactions of an agent with a new one will not have a visible effect.
Definition 7. Let π be a mapping, a ∈ Aπ and a
′ /∈ Aπ . The renaming of a to a
′ in π,
denoted by π[a′/a], is a mapping such that
π[a′/a](p) =
{
a′ if π(p) = a
π(p) otherwise
A protocol satisfies the condition Renaming iff π ∼ π[a′/a]∀π ∈ Π, a′ /∈ Aπ.
In other words, only the positions in which an agent appears in the trace matters. In
the rest of the paper, we assume that this condition holds and we write all mappings
in a normalized form, sorting the agents by their order of appearance: the first agent is
always a1, the next agent different from a1 will be a2 and so on. For example, we write
(a1, a1, a2, a3, a1, a2) instead of (a5, a5, a3, a1, a5, a3). Thus, the number of possible
traces is always finite for any given length, even when the number of agents is infinite.
Condition Swapping. Consider π1 = (. . . , a1, a2, . . .) and π2 = (. . . , a3, a4, . . .),
two mappings where the k-th and k + 1-st transactions involve different agents. Now
assume that π1 ∼ π2 and consider the mappings π′1 = (. . . , a2, a1, . . .) and π
′
2 =
(. . . , a4, a3, . . .) that differ from π1 and π2 only for the k-th and k+1-st agents. We re-
quire that different agents act in an independent way and the execution of the one should
not affect the execution of the other. Thus, π′1 and π
′
2 should also be indistinguishable.
Definition 8. Let π be a mapping. The swapping of π at position k < |π|, denoted by
swk(π) is a new mapping such that:
swk(π)(pi) =


π(pk+1) if pi = pk
π(pk) if pi = pk+1
π(pi) otherwise
A protocol satisfies the condition Swapping iff π ∼ π′ ⇒ swk(π) ∼ swk(π
′) for all
π, π′, k such that π(pk) 6= π(pk+1) and π
′(pk) 6= π
′(pk+1).
In practice, the condition Swapping simply implies that the agents are independent of
each other. As a consequence, the order of appearance of agents does not affect the
knowledge of the attacker. Note that this condition is violated in the Example 3. The
mappings (a1, a1, a2) and (a1, a2, a3) produce the same observations (_, _, _). How-
ever, by swapping the second and third transactions, we obtain the mappings (a1, a2, a1)
and (a1, a2, a3), which produce different observations: (_, _, beep) and (_, _, _). This
happens because the execution of one agent depends on the previous executions of other
agents.
Conditions: Extension I and II. We now introduce two last conditions. The first states
that two equivalent mappings should preserve their equivalence when extended with a
new transaction mapped to a new agent. The underlying idea is that adding a new agent
should not make two traces distinguishable, if they could not be distinguished before.
Definition 9. Let π be a mapping. The extension of π with a new agent a /∈ Aπ , denoted
by extn(π), is a mapping of length |π|+ 1 such that
extn(π)(pi) =
{
π(pi) i ≤ |π|
a i = |π|+ 1
A protocol satisfies the condition Extension I if π ∼ π′ ⇒ extn(π) ∼ extn(π′) for all
mappings π, π′.
Note that this condition is violated by the protocol in the Example 4. The mappings
(a1, a1, a1), (a1, a1, a2) are equivalent (produce no beep), while their extensions are
not, since (a1, a1, a1, a2) does not make the reader beep while (a1, a1, a2, a3) does.
For the second extension condition, consider two equivalent mappings π1, π2 of
length n. We extend these mappings with a new transaction pn+1, which is mapped to
the last agent appearing in each mapping. Since the attacker had access to these agents
during the transaction pn, and she could not distinguish the two mappings, she does not
gain any new knowledge by querying the same agents in the new transactions.
Definition 10. Let π be a mapping. The extension of π with the last appearing agent,
denoted by extl(π) is a mapping of length |π|+ 1 such that
extl(π)(pi) =
{
π(pi) i ≤ |π|
π(p|π|) i = |π|+ 1
A protocol satisfies the condition Extension II if π ∼ π′ ⇒ extl(π) ∼ extl(π′) for all
mappings π, π′.
This condition is violated by the protocol in the Example 5. In fact, the traces with
mappings (a1, a1) and (a1, a2) are not distinguishable, while their extensions are dis-
tinguishable because the first trace produces no beep while the second beeps.
5.2 Equivalence results
In this section we demonstrate that under the conditions stated in Section 5.1, all the
definitions of unlinkability coincide. Moreover, we prove that, under a smaller set of
conditions, the definitions of inseparability coincide as well as all the strong definitions.
Theorem 4 (Unification of unlinkability). If a protocol guarantees all the conditions
of Section 5.1 then all the unlinkability properties (weak unlinkability, strong unlinka-
bility, game-based unlinkability) coincide.
The intuition is that, under these conditions, all the definitions require all the equal
length mappings to be equivalent in particular to a mapping where all the transactions
are not linked.
Theorem 5 (Unification of inseparability). Under the conditions Renaming and Ex-
tension II, a protocol satisfies weak inseparability iff it satisfies strong inseparability.
Again, under these conditions, both properties require all the mappings of the same
length to be equivalent, in particular to one where all the transactions are linked.
Theorem 6 (Unification of strong properties).Under the conditionsUnbounded num-
ber of agents and Renaming, all the strong properties (strong unlinkability, game-based
unlinkability, strong inseparability) coincide.
It is worth noting that this result uses weaker assumptions than the previous ones; in-
deed, the conditions Swapping and Extension I and II are not needed. An unbounded
number of agents is required to guarantee the existence of completely unlinked traces
(for strong unlinkability), while the condition Renaming implies that agents are not
observationally different (for strong inseparability and game-based unlinkability).
Finally, we can state the result we were aiming at.
Corollary 1. If a protocol guarantees all the conditions of Section 5.1 then all the forms
of unlinkability and inseparability coincide.
This result shows that all the privacy definitions of Section 4 coincide under a set of
conditions.
6 RFID systems: single-step protocols
In this section, we show that the conditions stated in the previous section are satisfied
by a generic class of “single-step” protocols [7]. To this end, we express such protocols
in the applied pi calculus, using the model of [3], which defines an instantiation of our
model, i.e. it provides a concrete set of traces and an equivalence relation between them.
Single-step protocols consist of a single message from a tag to a reader. A protocol
of this class is shown in Figure 1. Each tag is initialized with an internal state S0,
which contains a secret s that is unique to that tag. At each run of the protocol, the tag
computes an output function O(S) on its current state S, and sends the result to the
reader. Then, the tag computes an update function U(S) on its current state S. O and
U can be arbitrary functions, using any cryptographic operation that can be modelled
by an equational theory in the applied pi calculus. As discussed in [7], two well-known
protocols from the literature, namely the OSK protocol [21] and the basic hash protocol
of [27], fall in this class.
6.1 Modelling single-step protocols
We model single-step protocols in the applied pi calculus [1], a language for describing
concurrent processes and their interaction. It extends the pi calculus [19] adding the
possibility to model cryptographic primitives using a signature and an equational theory.
A detailed description of the calculus is available in [1]; here, we only assume a basic
understanding of the calculus.
Tags are modelled as processes in the calculus, using a public channel c to commu-
nicate with the reader. To model the state of a tag, we use an internal channel w. The
content of the state is available to the tag by a sub-process w〈S〉 running in parallel to
Fig. 1. A single-step protocol.
it, so the tag can read the state by an input on w. A tag execution can be modelled as
follows:
TagExec
∆
= c(_). w(x). νρ˜. c〈O(x)〉. w〈U(x)〉
The tag is first triggered by an input on the public channel c (without reading a value).
Then, it reads the current state x by an input onw and outputsO(x) on a public channel.
νρ˜ denotes the possibility of generating fresh nonces for the output. Finally, the tag
outputs U(x) on w, updating its state with the new value.
A complete tag starts with an initial state S0, containing the tag secret s, and can
execute an unbounded number of sessions.
Tag
∆
= νs.νw.(w〈S0〉 | !TagExec)
Note that the secret is private to the tag, thus we use a freshly generated name s. We
also restrict w so that only the tag can access its state. Finally, the complete system P
consists of an unbounded number of tags: P
∆
= !Tag. Here the reader only triggers
tags. Since c is public, the tag can be triggered by any external process, so we can
simply omit the reader altogether.
6.2 Instantiating our trace model
The system P can perform labelled transitions, according to the semantics of the applied
pi calculus. We denote by
α
=⇒ a sequence of internal transitions, followed by the visible
transition α, followed again by internal transitions. A trace tr is a sequence
tr = P
α1=⇒ P1
α2=⇒ P2
α3=⇒ . . .
αq
=⇒ Pq
Two traces are equivalent, denoted by tr1 ∼tr tr2 if they contain the same transitions,
and all intermediate processes are statically equivalent according to the definition of
[1], which states that the processes provide the attacker with the same static knowledge.
We refer to [3] for the formal definition of ∼tr.
To instantiate our trace model, we need do define a set of agentsA, a set of strategies
Σ such that a strategy σ together with a mapping π give rise to a trace τ = (π, σ), and
an equivalence relation ∼ between traces. The agents A = {ai|i ∈ N} correspond to
the tags of the system. In the applied pi calculus model, we use replication to denote an
unbounded number of tags. We identify the tags by their secret s, which is unique for
each tag. When ai is spawned we denote its secret by si.
Since tags in single-step protocols have no input, the only thing that the attacker
can decide is how many transactions she will run, and how many protocol executions
she will trigger in each transaction. Thus, a strategy σ is a sequence σ = (σ1, . . . , σk)
such that k is the number of transactions the attacker performs, and σi the number of
executions that she triggers in the transaction pi. A mapping π determines which tag
will participate in each transaction. Given a strategy σ and a mapping π, we can define
a unique trace tr(π, σ) starting from P . We also define trace equivalence as follows:
(π, σ) ∼ (π, σ′) iff tr(π, σ) ∼tr tr(π, σ
′)
Now that we have a concrete trace model for single-step protocols, we can show
that they satisfy all the conditions of Section 5.1.
Theorem 7. Single-step protocols satisfy all the conditions of Section 5.1, thus all the
unlinkability and inseparability properties coincide.
We can conclude that all the forms of unlinkability and inseparability defined in
Section 4 coincide for the class of single-step protocols. As a consequence, if any of
these properties is proven to hold for a single-step protocol, by Theorem 7 all the un-
linkability and inseparability properties should be satisfied.
7 Related work
Our work makes direct use of several definitions of unlinkability from the literature.
As explained in detail in Section 4, we express the notion of weak unlinkability of [12,
3], strong unlinkability of [2, 3], and game-based definitions of [10, 17, 21, 4, 22, 20].
While all these works have given their own definitions of privacy properties in a very
specific context, ours provides a more general and abstract framework where all other
definitions can be captured.
Epistemic models have been used in the past to formalize privacy. Similarly to our
work, [15] gives general privacy definitions for a multiagent system using a modal logic
of knowledge. The paper considers different levels of strength for unlinkability, provid-
ing some probabilistic definition as well. In [9], epistemic logic is used to give intuitive
definitions of privacy in voting systems, with the applied pi calculus as the underly-
ing model. Similarly, [11] proposes a framework in which protocols are expressed in
a process language while security properties in a logic with both temporal and epis-
temic operators. The properties considered in the above works are quite different than
the unlinkability properties that we consider in this paper. Moreover, the above works
are involved with the mechanics of the corresponding formalisms, while we try to com-
pletely abstract from the concrete model, viewing a system as an abstract set of traces.
Several other definitions of unlinkability have also been studied in the literature. A
logic approach has been followed in [25], where an axiom system is defined to reason
about anonymity, and in [16] that expresses privacy properties using logic and models
the system through other formalisms, like CSP, combining two different techniques.
As in our work, logic is used to define in a natural way privacy properties, while hav-
ing an abstract model applicable to any real system. However, while our work focuses
on unlinkability, [15] and [25] study anonymity, namely a property that ensures that
the identity of the agent which executes some action remains hidden from other ob-
servers. [23] proposes a terminology for anonymity, unlinkability, unobservability and
pseudonimity. While it aims at clarifying terminology at an informal level, our work
aims instead at comparing definitions of unlinkability in a unifying formal model.
Finally, other papers introduce the notion of unlinkability using approaches based
on information theory. Examples are [14], [24], and [6] that give probabilistic descrip-
tions of unlinkability, quantifying the linkability of items in the system. Our work does
not provide any probabilistic definition, but this would be possible following the ap-
proach used in [15], that we leave as future work.
8 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we studied the privacy notion of unlinkability. We captured several defini-
tions from the literature into a simple abstract model based on epistemic logic, obtaining
natural and intuitive definitions in terms of the attacker’s knowledge. We also identified
inseparability, a notion dual to unlinkability, in weak and strong forms. Moreover, we
showed that these privacy definitions are different in general, but do coincide in systems
satisfying a set of conditions. Finally, we proved that the conditions hold for a class of
identification protocols.
As future work, we plan at investigating probabilistic descriptions of unlinkabil-
ity. We also plan at developing a more concrete model in the style of [11]. This work
bridges the gap between operational semantics and epistemic logic, offering a combined
framework where it is possible to easily model the behavior of a protocol in a process
language with an operational semantics and reason about properties expressed in a rich
epistemic temporal logic. This would allow to automatically verify privacy properties.
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